Cradle provisioning
The Cradle is the hardware root-of-trust for Host-tier and Architect-tier operations. This reference specifies the first-time enrolment procedure, the key ceremony, and the replacement path for a lost or compromised device.
Device delivery
Cradles are shipped as sealed hardware devices with tamper-evident packaging. Each shipment contains the device, a printed activation slip identifying the bound operator, and a QR code consumed by the Nebbos App during provisioning. Each Cradle is personalised to a specific operator identity at manufacture; enrolment against any other identity is refused.
First-time enrolment
Physical connection and platform sign-in
The Cradle is inserted into the operator’s workstation. The Nebbos App detects the device and initiates a platform sign-in flow using the operator’s device-native biometric authenticator.
Biometric enrolment
Between one and three biometric templates (fingerprint, face, or platform authenticator credential) are enrolled to the Cradle’s secure element. Templates remain within the secure element throughout their lifecycle.
Key ceremony
The Cradle generates its device-key pair within the secure element and emits the public component. The platform binds the public key to the operator identity via an audit-chain entry. The private component remains within the secure element.
Initial memory synchronisation
The Cradle synchronises its scoped slice of the operator’s Pearl memory and the current audit-chain anchor. Read operations on the Cradle thereafter execute without network connectivity.
Attestation validation
The Nebbos App executes one attested read and one attested write to verify that the platform-side receipt and the Cradle-side receipt exchange the expected hashes. Failure at any step is reported with an identified failure point rather than presented as a successful enrolment.
Replacement path
Lost, stolen, or physically damaged Cradles require replacement. The replacement path is designed to preserve substrate integrity through revocation and re-provisioning:
Loss reporting
The operator reports the lost Cradle through the platform, using a Guest-tier read supplemented by a signed acknowledgement from a paired identity endpoint.
Device-key revocation
The substrate revokes the reported Cradle’s device key. In-flight delegations from the revoked Cradle cease to verify at the substrate. The revocation is recorded as a distinct audit-chain entry.
Replacement shipment
A replacement device is shipped to the physical address on file for the operator identity, in tamper-evident packaging.
Re-provisioning
The replacement Cradle is enrolled through the same five-step procedure. The operator’s existing Pearl memory is re-materialised on the new Cradle from the platform-side backup.
Replacement time to arrival is a maximum of forty-eight hours under the standard SLA and twelve hours under the enterprise SLA. See SLA for the complete commitment.
Cradle contents
Each Cradle stores the following content:
- The MCP binary
- The operator’s Pearl memory slice, encrypted at rest
- The device key, within the secure element
- A rolling audit-chain anchor
Cradles do not contain other operators’ data, shared model weights, or platform-side substrate. These items remain within the Nebbos-managed data plane.